My research explores how international institutions influence human and interstate security. It builds from the premise that international and civil violence occur because relevant political actors cannot commit to ceasing violent behavior. I show that international law and organizations help actors overcome commitment problems, forgo the use of violence, and reach peaceful settlements. This is a theoretical perspective I apply to a number of forms of political violence, including battlefield and civilian deaths in civil wars, coups against sovereign regimes, and interstate disputes. I use multiple methods, including large-n data analyses and survey experiments, to understand how international institutions change political behavior.
Research
Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon. 2015. "United Nations Peacekeeping Dynamics and the Duration of Post-Civil Conflict Peace." Conflict Management and Peace Science.
How do the qualities of United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKOs) influence the duration of peace after civil wars? Recent work shows that UN peacekeeping extends the duration of peace. However, this work has only been able to assess whether the presence or absence of UN missions affects post-conflict peace processes. Such analyses offer little in the way of policy prescriptions for planning and structuring PKOs to effectively pursue their goals. By employing fine-grained data on the personnel composition of PKOs, and generating expectations from rationalist bargaining models of civil war, we argue that the number and type of personnel deployed to a PKO influence the UN’s ability guarantee peace by addressing the information and commitment problems that so often lead to the collapse of post-conflict peace. We analyze how the composition of missions influences the duration of peace, finding that, as the number of UN military troops deployed increases, the chance of civil war recurring decreases. However, other personnel types do not have the same effect. We conclude that the effectiveness of post-conflict peacekeeping lies in the ability of PKOs to alleviate commitment problems through the deployment of military troops that are able to defend the peace.
Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon. 2014. "Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting." American Political Science Review 108(4):737-753.
A blog post about this paper can be found at the Early Warning Project here. Replication data is here.
While United Nations peacekeeping missions were created to keep peace and perform post-conflict activities, since the end of the Cold War peacekeepers are more often deployed to active conflicts. Yet, we know little about their ability to manage ongoing violence. This paper provides the first broad empirical examination of UN peacekeeping effectiveness in reducing battlefield violence in civil wars. We analyze how the number of UN peacekeeping personnel deployed influences the amount of battlefield deaths in all civil wars in Africa from 1992 to 2011. The analyses show that increasing numbers of armed military troops are associated with reduced battlefield deaths, while police and observers are not. Considering that the UN is often criticized for ineffectiveness, these results have important implications: if appropriately composed, UN peacekeeping missions reduce violent conflict.
Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon. 2013. "United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War." American Journal of Political Science 57(4):875-891.
See the Monkey Cage post about this article here. Check out our blog post about the article at the AJPS website here, at the E-International Relations site here, or at The Early Warning Project here. Businessweek made mention here. Data and replication file available from AJPS Dataverse.
Does United Nations peacekeeping protect civilians in civil war? Civilian protection is a primary purpose of UN peacekeeping, yet there is little systematic evidence for whether peacekeeping prevents civilian deaths. We propose that UN peacekeeping can protect civilians if missions are adequately composed of military troops and police in large numbers. Using unique monthly data on the number and type of UN personnel contributed to peacekeeping operations, along with monthly data on civilian deaths from 1991 to 2008 in armed conflicts in Africa, we find that as the UN commits more military and police forces to a peacekeeping mission, fewer civilians are targeted with violence. The effect is substantial—the analyses show that, on average, deploying several thousand troops and several hundred police dramatically reduces civilian killings. We conclude that although the UN is often criticized for its failures, UN peacekeeping is an effective mechanism of civilian protection.
Shannon, Megan, Clayton Thyne, Amanda Dugan, and Sarah Hayden. 2014. "The International Community's Reaction to Coups." Foreign Policy Analysis.
Noted on The Monkey Cage.
With ten attempts since 2010, coups d’état are surprisingly common events with vital implications for a state’s political development. Aside from being disruptive internally, coups influence interstate relationships. Though coups have important consequences, we know little about how the international community responds to these upheavals. This paper explores what drives global actors to react to coups. Our theory differentiates between normative concerns (e.g., protection of democracy) and material interests (e.g., protection of oil exports) as potential determinants of international responses to coups. We argue that coups against democracies, coups after the Cold War, and coups in states heavily integrated into the international community are all more likely to elicit global reaction. Using newly collected data, we explore the number of signals that states and IOs send to coup states from 1950 to 2011. The analyses reveal that coups against democracies and wealthy states draw more attention. States react when democracies are challenged by coups, while IOs react to coups in Africa and coups during the post-Cold War period. We surprisingly find that heavy traders and oil-rich states do not necessarily receive more reaction, suggesting that international actors are more driven by normative concerns than material interests when reacting to coups.
How do the qualities of United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKOs) influence the duration of peace after civil wars? Recent work shows that UN peacekeeping extends the duration of peace. However, this work has only been able to assess whether the presence or absence of UN missions affects post-conflict peace processes. Such analyses offer little in the way of policy prescriptions for planning and structuring PKOs to effectively pursue their goals. By employing fine-grained data on the personnel composition of PKOs, and generating expectations from rationalist bargaining models of civil war, we argue that the number and type of personnel deployed to a PKO influence the UN’s ability guarantee peace by addressing the information and commitment problems that so often lead to the collapse of post-conflict peace. We analyze how the composition of missions influences the duration of peace, finding that, as the number of UN military troops deployed increases, the chance of civil war recurring decreases. However, other personnel types do not have the same effect. We conclude that the effectiveness of post-conflict peacekeeping lies in the ability of PKOs to alleviate commitment problems through the deployment of military troops that are able to defend the peace.
Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon. 2014. "Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting." American Political Science Review 108(4):737-753.
A blog post about this paper can be found at the Early Warning Project here. Replication data is here.
While United Nations peacekeeping missions were created to keep peace and perform post-conflict activities, since the end of the Cold War peacekeepers are more often deployed to active conflicts. Yet, we know little about their ability to manage ongoing violence. This paper provides the first broad empirical examination of UN peacekeeping effectiveness in reducing battlefield violence in civil wars. We analyze how the number of UN peacekeeping personnel deployed influences the amount of battlefield deaths in all civil wars in Africa from 1992 to 2011. The analyses show that increasing numbers of armed military troops are associated with reduced battlefield deaths, while police and observers are not. Considering that the UN is often criticized for ineffectiveness, these results have important implications: if appropriately composed, UN peacekeeping missions reduce violent conflict.
Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon. 2013. "United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War." American Journal of Political Science 57(4):875-891.
See the Monkey Cage post about this article here. Check out our blog post about the article at the AJPS website here, at the E-International Relations site here, or at The Early Warning Project here. Businessweek made mention here. Data and replication file available from AJPS Dataverse.
Does United Nations peacekeeping protect civilians in civil war? Civilian protection is a primary purpose of UN peacekeeping, yet there is little systematic evidence for whether peacekeeping prevents civilian deaths. We propose that UN peacekeeping can protect civilians if missions are adequately composed of military troops and police in large numbers. Using unique monthly data on the number and type of UN personnel contributed to peacekeeping operations, along with monthly data on civilian deaths from 1991 to 2008 in armed conflicts in Africa, we find that as the UN commits more military and police forces to a peacekeeping mission, fewer civilians are targeted with violence. The effect is substantial—the analyses show that, on average, deploying several thousand troops and several hundred police dramatically reduces civilian killings. We conclude that although the UN is often criticized for its failures, UN peacekeeping is an effective mechanism of civilian protection.
Shannon, Megan, Clayton Thyne, Amanda Dugan, and Sarah Hayden. 2014. "The International Community's Reaction to Coups." Foreign Policy Analysis.
Noted on The Monkey Cage.
With ten attempts since 2010, coups d’état are surprisingly common events with vital implications for a state’s political development. Aside from being disruptive internally, coups influence interstate relationships. Though coups have important consequences, we know little about how the international community responds to these upheavals. This paper explores what drives global actors to react to coups. Our theory differentiates between normative concerns (e.g., protection of democracy) and material interests (e.g., protection of oil exports) as potential determinants of international responses to coups. We argue that coups against democracies, coups after the Cold War, and coups in states heavily integrated into the international community are all more likely to elicit global reaction. Using newly collected data, we explore the number of signals that states and IOs send to coup states from 1950 to 2011. The analyses reveal that coups against democracies and wealthy states draw more attention. States react when democracies are challenged by coups, while IOs react to coups in Africa and coups during the post-Cold War period. We surprisingly find that heavy traders and oil-rich states do not necessarily receive more reaction, suggesting that international actors are more driven by normative concerns than material interests when reacting to coups.
Gent, Stephen, and Megan Shannon. 2014. “Bargaining Power and the Arbitration and Adjudication of Territorial Claims.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 31(3):303-322.
To examine the political factors that influence the use of legal mechanisms to resolve territorial disputes, we model the decision to pursue arbitration and adjudication as part of a bargaining process in the shadow of war. We find that arbitration and adjudication can help prevent bargaining breakdown, but states only pursue and comply with such measures when the expected ruling reflects the balance of power between them. To test the theory, we examine compliance with arbitral and adjudicated rulings on territorial claims. In line with our expectations, states are less likely to comply when the stronger disputant is asked to make greater concessions. We conclude that power politics constrain the conditions under which legal mechanisms can be used to successfully manage contentious claims over territory.
To examine the political factors that influence the use of legal mechanisms to resolve territorial disputes, we model the decision to pursue arbitration and adjudication as part of a bargaining process in the shadow of war. We find that arbitration and adjudication can help prevent bargaining breakdown, but states only pursue and comply with such measures when the expected ruling reflects the balance of power between them. To test the theory, we examine compliance with arbitral and adjudicated rulings on territorial claims. In line with our expectations, states are less likely to comply when the stronger disputant is asked to make greater concessions. We conclude that power politics constrain the conditions under which legal mechanisms can be used to successfully manage contentious claims over territory.
Gent, Stephen, and Megan Shannon. 2011. “Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(5):710-734.
International relations scholars have garnered a good deal of evidence indicating that binding arbitration and adjudication are highly effective means for brokering agreements and ending conflict. However, binding third party conflict management is rarely pursued to resolve interstate disputes. While states value the effectiveness of binding procedures, they are reluctant to give up the decision control necessary to submit to arbitration or adjudication. We identify four factors that influence the willingness of states to give up decision control: issue salience, preference similarity, availability of outside options, and history of negotiations. An analysis of attempts to settle territorial, maritime, and river claims reveals that disputants are less likely to use binding conflict management when they have a greater need to maintain decision control.
International relations scholars have garnered a good deal of evidence indicating that binding arbitration and adjudication are highly effective means for brokering agreements and ending conflict. However, binding third party conflict management is rarely pursued to resolve interstate disputes. While states value the effectiveness of binding procedures, they are reluctant to give up the decision control necessary to submit to arbitration or adjudication. We identify four factors that influence the willingness of states to give up decision control: issue salience, preference similarity, availability of outside options, and history of negotiations. An analysis of attempts to settle territorial, maritime, and river claims reveals that disputants are less likely to use binding conflict management when they have a greater need to maintain decision control.
Gent, Stephen and Megan Shannon. 2011. “Bias and the Effectiveness of Third Party Conflict Management Mechanisms.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 28(2):124-144.
To uncover the relationship between bias and effective conflict resolution, we explore the bias of third parties and the techniques they employ in the management of river, maritime, and territorial claims. We find that biased third parties are more likely than unbiased third parties to facilitate the weakest and least intrusive forms of conflict management. Bias increases the likelihood that a third party will use unobtrusive techniques like good offices and decreases its propensity to facilitate involved mechanisms such as arbitration. Additionally, bias is inversely related to the range of issues addressed at a settlement attempt. As such, unbiased third parties are more effective because they are used for the management techniques that have the most potential to resolve conflicts.
To uncover the relationship between bias and effective conflict resolution, we explore the bias of third parties and the techniques they employ in the management of river, maritime, and territorial claims. We find that biased third parties are more likely than unbiased third parties to facilitate the weakest and least intrusive forms of conflict management. Bias increases the likelihood that a third party will use unobtrusive techniques like good offices and decreases its propensity to facilitate involved mechanisms such as arbitration. Additionally, bias is inversely related to the range of issues addressed at a settlement attempt. As such, unbiased third parties are more effective because they are used for the management techniques that have the most potential to resolve conflicts.
Shannon, Megan, Daniel S. Morey, and Frederick J. Boehmke. 2010. “The Influence of International Organizations on Militarized Dispute Initiation and Duration.” International Studies Quarterly 54(4):1123-1141.
We identify the role of international organizations in conflict bargaining and argue that IOs can decrease the duration of international conflicts. Institutional memberships mitigate commitment problems and encourage combatants to cease hostilities more quickly. Empirical analyses of MID duration (1950-2000) reveal that increasing shared IO participation reduces the length of disputes, even after controlling for the possible effects on dispute initiation.
We identify the role of international organizations in conflict bargaining and argue that IOs can decrease the duration of international conflicts. Institutional memberships mitigate commitment problems and encourage combatants to cease hostilities more quickly. Empirical analyses of MID duration (1950-2000) reveal that increasing shared IO participation reduces the length of disputes, even after controlling for the possible effects on dispute initiation.
Gent, Stephen and Megan Shannon. 2010. “The Effectiveness of International Arbitration and Adjudication: Getting Into a Bind.” Journal of Politics 72(2):366-380.
Scholars and policymakers argue that the bias of a third party affects its ability to resolve conflicts. In an investigation of international territorial claims, however, we find that the conflict management technique is much more important for ending disputes than a third party’s level of bias. Binding third party mechanisms (arbitration and adjudication) more effectively end territorial claims than other conflict management techniques because they provide legality, increased reputation costs, and domestic political cover. The characteristics of the third party, on the other hand, have no effect on the success of a settlement attempt. Bias plays only an indirect role in conflict resolution, as territorial rivals generally turn to unbiased intermediaries to broker binding negotiations. We conclude that impartial third party conflict management does not directly lead to successful negotiations. Rather, disputants favor unbiased third parties to broker the types of talks most likely to end international disputes.
Scholars and policymakers argue that the bias of a third party affects its ability to resolve conflicts. In an investigation of international territorial claims, however, we find that the conflict management technique is much more important for ending disputes than a third party’s level of bias. Binding third party mechanisms (arbitration and adjudication) more effectively end territorial claims than other conflict management techniques because they provide legality, increased reputation costs, and domestic political cover. The characteristics of the third party, on the other hand, have no effect on the success of a settlement attempt. Bias plays only an indirect role in conflict resolution, as territorial rivals generally turn to unbiased intermediaries to broker binding negotiations. We conclude that impartial third party conflict management does not directly lead to successful negotiations. Rather, disputants favor unbiased third parties to broker the types of talks most likely to end international disputes.
Shannon, Megan. 2009. “Preventing War and Providing the Peace? International Organizations and the Management of Territorial Disputes.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 26(2): 144-163.
I explore whether international organizations (IOs) promote peaceful conflict management. Using territorial claims data, I find that organizations with interventionist capabilities encourage disputing members to attempt peaceful conflict resolution. Then, to more fully uncover the causal relationship between IOs and conflict management, I investigate the influence of IOs on bilateral dispute settlement separately from third party settlement. The analyses reveal that institutions do not promote bilateral negotiations between members, indicating that the socialization and trust-building capabilities of IOs are limited. However, institutions foster multilateral talks, demonstrating that IOs broker bargaining with third party diplomatic intervention.
I explore whether international organizations (IOs) promote peaceful conflict management. Using territorial claims data, I find that organizations with interventionist capabilities encourage disputing members to attempt peaceful conflict resolution. Then, to more fully uncover the causal relationship between IOs and conflict management, I investigate the influence of IOs on bilateral dispute settlement separately from third party settlement. The analyses reveal that institutions do not promote bilateral negotiations between members, indicating that the socialization and trust-building capabilities of IOs are limited. However, institutions foster multilateral talks, demonstrating that IOs broker bargaining with third party diplomatic intervention.